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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Medicare program is now an important source of transfers to elderly
and disabled beneficiaries, and wifi continue to grow rapidly in the fu-
ture. Because the Medicare program is so large in magnitude, it can have
significant redistributional effects. In this paper, we measure the flow of
Medicare benefits to high-income and low-income neighborhoods in
1990 and 1995. We find that Medicare spending per capita for the lowest
income groups grew much more rapidly than Medicare spending in
either high-income or middle-income neighborhoods. Home health care
spending played an important role in the increased spending among the
lowest income neighborhoods. To our knowledge, this differential shift
in spending has not been documented, yet it exceeds in magnitude the
entire per capita transfer from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and is
half of the average transfers to the elderly poor from Supplemental Secu-
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rity Income (SSI). Recent cutbacks in home health care benefits may
undo some of this change. Still, this example illustrates how specific
technical changes in Medicare policy can have redistributional effects
comparable to major and much more visible expenditure and tax policies.
1. INTRODUCTION
The original purpose of Medicare was to provide insurance for elderly
people with inadequate or no health insurance coverage. During the
debate on Medicare, there was surprisingly little discussion of how to
finance the program, perhaps because the expenses were relatively
small and the decision had already been made to link Medicare financing
to the social security tax system (Marmor, 1973). In the first year, 1966,
Part B premiums were just $3 per month, and the maximum amount any
worker paid into the Part A payroll tax was $23 annually.
Since 1966, of course, the breadth and size of the Medicare program
has grown dramatically. Fiscal year 1998 spending on Medicare was
estimated to be over $220 billion, roughly two-thirds of total social secu-
rity benefits. Medicare spending is projected to continue to grow at a
substantially faster rate than social security, so that within several de-
cades, Medicare expenditures are expected to exceed social security
spending. Indeed, Fuchs (1998) projects that by 2020 per capita Medicare
spending wifi be roughly equal to total spending on non-medical goods
and services for the elderly population. Aside from its value as health
insurance, the Medicare program now represents a large and growing
part of total government support for the elderly, as well as a large share
of taxes paid by the young. Yet there is little research on the extent to
which the government is transferring resources from young to old, or
from rich to poor (or vice versa).1
In this paper, we consider the role that Medicare has played in chang-
ing the distribution of income and health, broadly defined, for the el-
derly population in the first half of the 1990s. We address these issues
with a panel of Medicare claims data from 1990 and 1995 linked by ZIP
code to Census data on income. We document a dramatic change in the
pattern of Medicare spending between 1990 and 1995. During this pe-
riod, Medicare spending per capita (normalized to a representative 75-
year-old) in the top income dedile rose by $534, or 16 percent. During the
same period, Medicare spending per capita in the bottom income decile
1Exceptions are Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1992), who consider intergenerational
issues, and Vogel (1988), who considers intragenerational transfers. Also see McClellan
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rose by $1277, or 43 percent. As we argue below, the differential increase
in per capita spending, $743 (or $1277-$534) represents an increased
redistributional role for Medicare. To put in perspective the magnitude
of this $743 per capita redistribution, it is useful to note that the change
in benefits is of similar magnitude to the entire average transfer to lower-
income groups of either the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the
Supplemental Social Insurance (SSI) program. In other words, changes
in the Medicare program since 1990 alone have resulted in dramatic and
largely unnoticed transfers to low-income elderly people in the form of
in-kind transfers of health care. One very important part of this puzzle is
the dramatic growth in home health care spending among lower-income
households, particularly in states such as Texas and Tennessee where
the growth in Medicare-financed home health care has been most rapid
(Wennberg and Cooper, 1997).
The obvious question is whether the additional spending has resulted
in increased well-being among those receiving the transfers. At least in
terms of longevity, the effects are not apparent. During the 1990-1995
period, we find no improvement in mortality rates of lower income
Medicare enrollees; if anything, disparities in mortality rates by income
group widened during this period.
2. THE STRUCTURE OF MEDICARE
Medicare includes two programs. Medicare Part A is insurance for hospi-
tal care and some alternatives to hospitalization, and Medicare Part B is
insurance for physician, outpatient, and now most home health ser-
vices. The Part A payroll tax rate is 2.9 percent, half levied on the em-
ployee and half on the employer. Currently there is no upper limit on
this payroll tax, so it is a proportional tax with respect to earnings. Until
recently, the payroll tax was capped at the same maximum income level
as social security, so many of the elderly today will have paid their
Medicare contributions with modest limits on taxable earning (only
$7800 in 1971, for example). Thus the tax was regressive for the cohort
who are currently retired (see McClellan and Skinner, 1997).
Medicare Part B is financed partly by beneficiary premiums that cover
around one-fourth of expenditures. This premium is also regressive,
because it is a fixed payment regardless of the income of the recipient.2
The remaining revenue for the Part B program comes from general fed-
2The exception is when the Part B payments are covered by the Qualified Medicare
Beneficiary (QMB) or the Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMB) programs
discussed below. See Moon, Gage, and Evans (1997) and Moon and Kuntz (1996).88Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
eral tax revenues, which are financed progressively. Thus the tax base
for Medicare is a combination of progressive, proportional, and regres-
sive tax instruments. The progressivity of the combined Medicare taxes
depends on how much revenue is raised through Part B premiums or
other beneficiary contributions, general tax revenues, or the Part A pay-
roll tax (McClellan and Skinner, 1999).
The financing method also matters for the intergenerational redistribu-
tion of the Medicare system (Vogel, 1988). In pioneering work, Auer-
bach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1992) quantified the generation-specific
transfers resulting from the Medicare program and showed that they
were substantial. Moreover, in contrast to the decline in intergen-
erational transfers that has occurred under social security financing
rules, such transfers are likely to remain substantial for Medicare. As
long as expenditure growth per beneficiary continues to exceed GDP
(and population) growth plus increases in tax rates during the beneficia-
ries' working years, current beneficiaries wifi continue to receive benefits
that exceed their contributions to the program under Medicare's "pay as
you go" financing rules (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 1992). Youn-
ger workers account for most federal tax revenue for Part B, and almost
all of the payroll tax revenue for Part A. The declining importance of the
Part B premium in financing the program (originally it accounted for 50
percent of costs) has also contributed to the already substantial inter-
generational transfers from the young to the elderly.
Changes in Medicare financing to switch more of the burden to cur-
rent beneficiaries can also affect intragenerational transfers. For exam-
ple, suppose Part B premiums were increased and general revenues
were reduced, leaving total tax revenue unchanged. This reduces the
intergenerational transfers, while at the same time placing a larger tax
burden on lower-income Medicare enrollees, reducing the within-cohort
redistributional component of Medicare (McClellan and Skinner, 1999).
If Medicare expenditures did not vary across groups with different
lifetime incomes, these analyses of intragenerational and intergen-
erational transfers associated with Medicare financing would be suffi-
cient for understanding Medicare's distributional implications. How-
ever, there have been some indications that Medicare use differs by
income group. Davis and Reynolds (1975) found that Part B expendi-
tures were twice as high for high-income Medicare beneficiaries as for
those in the lowest income category. Moreover, with changes in medical
technology, other aspects of the health care system, and Medicare poli-
cies, differences across spending groups may change over time. Some
evidence suggests that the differences declined over the 1970s (Link,
Long, and Settle, 1982). More recently, however, Gornick et al. (1996)The Distributional Effects of Medicare89
and McClellan and Skinner (1997) found Medicare spending among the
highest income deciles to be considerably higher than spending among
lower income deciles.
Previous studies of Medicare incidence have not controlled for possi-
ble differences in health status across income groups. The evidence sug-
gests higher levels of underlying morbidity and mortality among lower-
income households (House et al., 1990; Menchik, 1993; Preston and
Taubman, 1994; Pappas et al., 1993; Smith and Egger, 1992; Duleep,
1995). Thus, differences in Medicare spending across income groups
could be explained by the fact that, within lower income groups, there
are more people in poor health with greater demand for health care
services. Even under the National Health Service in Great Britain, where
expenditures per person tended to be constant across income groups,
expenditures per occurrence of an illness were 35 percent larger among
higher-income groups in England (LeGrand, 1982, p. 26). To the extent
that people with lower income have higher mortality risks, we might
further expect higher spending among this group simply because Medi-
care costs are so high in the last six months of life. To analyze distribu-
tional differences for individuals in similar health, we use a control
based on whether the individual died in the calendar year. While a
simple control variable, impending death is also among the strongest
predictors of Medicare expenditures (Lubitz and Riley, 1993).
This paper focuses primarily on dollar flows within the Medicare pro-
gram. But as we noted above, the primary role of Medicare is to provide
health insurance, and thus the program should be judged as more than
an income transfer program. When Medicare was started in 1965, it
provided the "missing market" of health insurance for those without
insurance. The value of having insurance coverage was greatest to
lower-income elderly, since they were least likely to have had health
insurance prior to Medicare (Epstein and Murray, 1967). Medicare also
provided better coverage than many of the existing private insurance
policies that were inadequate for the (then) rapid growth in health care
costs. Many standard insurance policies covered as little as $10 per day
in the hospital (U.S. Congress, 1964). While we recognize that the vari-
ous income groups and generations may place different implicit valua-
tionon being provided the "missing market" of insurance, thus affecting
the relative value (or incidence) of Medicare in a given year (as in Mc-
Clellan and Skinner, 1997), we suspect that there has not been a large
corresponding change in the insurance value of Medicare over so short a
period as 1990-1995. Thus, we focus on dollar flows in our analysis
below, while recognizing that simple dollar flows do not entirely capture
the utility-based value of the Medicare insurance program.90Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
Focusing on dollars alone, however, is less defensible when we con-
front the problem of moral hazard. As we find below, much of the
differential increase in Medicare spending is the consequence of expand-
ing home health care, much of the increase being due to patients receiv-
ing more than 200 visits per year. (Parente, Leon, and Dunbar, 1997).
Would these people have been better off with a cash transfer instead of
the 200th visit of the year? This is precisely the problem of moral hazard,
that individuals do not value the marginal or incremental visit as highly
as the cash value of the Medicare payments to the home health agency.
Without evidence on how multiple home health visits affect both individ-
ual satisfaction and longevity, we cannot pursue this approach directly,
but leave it for a future research topic. However, if moral hazard is an
important factor in evaluating these changes in Medicare spending, the
value of the differential health care for lower-income neighborhoods wifi
be less than our dollar calculations would suggest.
3. METHODS
We first begin with the complete claims (utilization and payment) data
for a 5 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries in 1990 and then con-
sider comparable data from 1995. This allows us to perform two types of
analysis. The first is to provide an indication of how health status affects
Medicare spending, and thus allows us to disentangle in part the link
between income levels and disability. The second analysis is to compare
spending and mortality patterns in 1990 and 1995.
The distribution of Medicare expenditures at the micro level is highly
skewed; many people register zero or small spending, while a very small
percentage of people account for very large expenses (often in excess of
$50,000), which in turn have a large influence on the overall expenditure
pattern of the Medicare program. This skewness creates statistical prob-
lems when estimating effects at the level of individuals (see, for example,
Manning et al., 1987). However, our objective is more straightforward
we are interested simply in average spending by income groups, the impor-
tant measure for the study of tax and benefit incidence. And because of
our very large data set, we can estimate average Medicare spending by
age and income group without worrying about outliers introducing exces-
sive noise in the statistical estimates. For this reason, our basic unit of
analysis with the claims data is the average spending within age, year,
income, and other discrete grouping categories (discussed below).
Controlling for health status is difficult using claims data, since they
do not include detailed measures of comorbid diseases and disease sever-
ity. Claims-related information is available (such as reported diagnoses),The Distributional Effects of Medicare91
but even these can be suspect, because the use of a hospital or other
medical service that leads to the reporting of a diagnosis may themselves
depend on income.3 To provide preliminary evidence on the importance
of health status, we control for a simple measure of health status
whether the individual died during the year of analysis. As we show
below, this dummy variable is a powerful predictor of Medicare utiliza-
tion. Our subsequent results are normalized to represent per capita Medi-
care spending among the population of people who did not die during
the year of analysis.4
4. DATA
Our claims histories of Medicare enrollees (age 65 and above) in 1990 and
1995 comprised approximately 1.4 million randomly sampled beneficia-
ries each year. In theory, this sample includes 5 percent of the entire
elderly population in the United States, since nearly every American
becomes eligible for Medicare at age 65. In practice, the program's cover-
age is less than complete; informal estimates by Health Care Financing
Administration staff place Part A enrolhnent at 95 percent to 98 percent
of the elderly, with rates near 100 percent for individuals over age 70 (see
also Fisher et al., 1990, who suggest participation rates for blacks may be
lower). We have also excluded individuals from our sample who were
enrolled in HMOs. The percentage of Medicare enrollees in HMOs was
still below 10 percent by 1995, the last year of the panel. Descriptive
statistics suggest that enrollment rates for HMOs rose more rapidly in
higher-income than in lower-income ZIP codes.
We matched these data by ZIP code to 1990 Census data on average
income developed by Census CD from the U.S. Census. Our Census
data include race-specific information on average income within a ZIP
code, so we calculated race-specific average income levels, and matched
the race-specific (black and non-black) average income values to the
Another option is to use a more detailed data set with survey data on individual-level
health status merged with Medicare claims data, such as the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey. The problem with this approach is that a large fraction of spending is accounted
for by a small number of people, so that even a sample size of 20,000 cannot reliably
estimate hospital spending (for example) for women age 65-74 in the top income decile.
' More formally, the expenditure model is written
M,tk=+ 13 + O< + h, + Ptk + e,
where Matk is the average level of spending at age a, in year t, and for income group k, cs, is
the age-specific influence, which may vary by year, andis the pure year effect. The
association of income with Medicare spending is measured by °tk' and the health status
control (which may or may not be included in the regression) is h,k; e,k is the error term.
Specific factors influencingM(such as state-level DSH payments) are denoted by p. A
similar structure holds for the mortality model, except we do not control for health status.92Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
appropriate individual-level Medicare data. We were unable to match 18
percent of Medicare beneficiaries because of changes in ZIP codes be-
tween 1990 and 1995 and difficulties in matching post office box ZIP
codes to census data. Finally, we used the average (race-specific) ZIP-
code information to divide the entire Medicare population into income
deciles (as of 1990), and computed differences in average expenditures
and mortality risks across these deciles.
The consistency of ZIP-based estimates of income with actual income
has been explored in previous studies (see, e.g., Geronimus, Bound,
and Neidert, 1996, for an excellent overview). ZIP-code income mea-
sures may be a noisy measure of the individual's actual income, in par-
ticular if the ZIP code has a diverse group of people living in it. Thus we
rely on the principle that across-group measures of association are, un-
der appropriate assumptions, valid and unbiased estimates of the true
within-group relationship between income and Medicare spending.
Even if data were available, individuals' own reports of current income
might be themselves subject to noise in measurement as well as possible
confounding effects of bad health on income.5 For example, if an individ-
ual aged 68 scales back on post-retirement work because of poor health,
there wifi occur a possibly spurious relationship between mortality and
income. ZIP-code measures may be a better indicator of "permanent" or
lifetime income.
5. RESULTS
We begin by showing the consequences of income-related differences in
health status for Medicare expenditures. Figure 1 shows Medicare ex-
penditures by income group for men and women in 1990. The lowest
income decile, 1, is on the left, and the highest decile, 10, is on the right
of the horizontal axis. Consider the highest curve, which is Medicare
expenditures estimated in a sample of men aged 65-74 (and bench-
marked for someone aged 70) without controlling for health status. (We
consider this group because of the marked income-based differences in
relative mortality risk; at older ages these differences become more
blurred.) Average spending is $3,134 (in 1995 dollars) at the lowest
income decile, and rises gradually to $3,348 in decile 10. The standard
error for all of the income-decile estimates is about 75, so Medicare
spending for the highest incomes is significantly higher than for the
Gornick et al. (1996) found that individual-level income measures generally suggested a
more pronounced relationship between income and use of medical services than did ZIP-
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FIGURE 1.Medicare Expenditures by ZIP-Code Income Decile, Cor-
rected and Uncorrected for Health Status, 1990, Men and Women
lowest incomes. The second-highest (dotted) line is average expendi-
hires for men after controlling for whether the individual died in 1990.
Average spending for those living is lower, and the income-related
difference is considerably more pronounced, with spending of $2,515 in
the lowest income decile versus $2,924 in the highest (t-statistic of 5.7).
The estimated average effect of death during the year is $14,760, with a
standard error of $88.
The association between income and Medicare spending among
women is quite weak, whether controlling for the last year of life or not
(seethe bottom two curves in Figure 1). Nevertheless, as expected, includ-
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Male 1990 .Male 1995 - - _Female 1990_Female 1995
FIGURE 2. Total Medicare Spending by Income Decile for Ages 65-74:
Men and Women during 1990 and 1995
Notes: Corrected for whether the individual died during the year. Normalized to a person aged 70.
ing the mortality variable makes the association between income and
Medicare expenditures stronger.
Figure 2 considers a broader set of correlations for both 1990 and 1995;
all of these estimates control for the last year of life. Most of the differ-
ences observed between high and low income levels are significant;
roughly speaking, any difference that exceeds $200 in any of the regres-
sions is significant at conventional levels.6 In 1990, as noted earlier, there
is a marked positive correlation between the average income of a neigh-
borhood and average Medicare spending for men, and a much smaller
correlation for women. It is these effects, combined with income-based
differences in survival, that led McClellan and Skinner (1997) to con-
clude that on net, the Medicare system redistributed within cohorts from
the lowest to the highest income groups. The patterns of spending for
the highest (4-10) deciles were similar in 1995 to patterns in 1990, al-
6The standard errors for the dummy variable estimates (against the null that the coeffi-
cients are equal to decile 1 spending) range from about $52 in 1990 for women to $96 for
men in 1995.
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FIGURE 3.Total Medicare Spending by Income Decile for Ages 75-84:
Men and Women during 1990 and 1995
Notes: Corrected for whether the individual died during the year. Normalized to a person aged 80.
though they shifted up because of general increases in real Medicare
spending.
By 1995, however, a striking change occurred in the pattern of spend-
ing for the bottom income deciles. For example, in the first income
decile, there was a dramatic jump in Medicare spending: an increase of
48 percent for women and 40 percent for men over just 5 years. By
contrast, the increase for the highest income groups was a much more
modest 17 percent for women and 12 percent for men.
Figure 3 shows this same pattern in a sample of men and women aged96Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
75-84, with all Medicare expenditures normalized for a beneficiary aged
80. There was a more pronounced correlation between income and Medi-
care spending among this older group; for the highest income decile,
spending in 1990 was 28 percent larger for men, and 15 percent larger for
women, than in the lowest income decile. Moving forward to 1995, there
is the same sharp increase in Medicare spending that we observed previ-
ously among the younger age group, although the shift is less dramatic.
Strong income-related differences in Medicare spending remain, but
now decile-lO Medicare spending is 26 percent higher than for the low-
est reference groups in deciles 3 and 4 (those living in ZIP codes between
the 20th and 40th percentiles of the income distribution), but just 10
percent higher than for the lowest income group, decile 1.
These graphs have illustrated two main points. The first is that Medi-
care spending by income group has been unequal, with higher income
groups accounting for a larger fraction of expenditures, especially after
controlling for an imperfect measure of illness. And second, there has
been a dramatic change in the pattern of Medicare spending since 1990.
A natural question is: what accounted for the sudden change in Medi-
care spending trends?
Table 1 presents some simple results to shed light on changes in
Medicare spending by income group. To avoid drowning the reader in
numbers and figures, we present average per capita Medicare spending
for just the highest income decile (10) and the lowest income decile (1),
using women and men aged 70-79 in our sample (N = 593,676 in 1990
and 599,086 in 1995) but normalizing all results to a person aged 75.
Panel la shows the dramatic increase in spending by the lowest decile
that we have observed in Figure 2. From 1990 to 1995, the increase in
Medicare spending for women in decile 10 was $591, or 19 percent, while
the corresponding increase for decile 1 was $1,485, or 52 percent. We
observe similar but less pronounced results for men. The average effects
across men and women can be obtained by noting that in this age group,
women make up 60 percent of the Medicare population. As in the previ-
ous analysis, these figures control for whether the individual died in the
given year.
Our measure of the relative change in Medicare spending is the extent
to which Medicare spending rose for the lowest-income decile (on a per
capita basis) in excess of the increase for the highest-income decile, that
is, the dif-in-dif of decile expenditure changes.7 Our measure assumes
that, in the absence of changes in the Medicare program that affected the
Recall also that our dif-in-dif measure is simply descriptive, and not meant to estimate
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distribution of spending, the dollar increase in each category would
have been the same for the two income groups.8 The distributional shift
is therefore $894 ($1485$591) for women and $517 ($965$448) for men.
These are both highly significant differences, as shown by the t-statistics
for the null hypothesis that the relative difference is zero. The combined
effect is $743 using the appropriate population weights of 0.60 and 0.40
for women and men in this age group.
Splitting Medicare spending into specific categories helps to identify
the source of these changes during the five-year period. Panels lblh
show the relative changes in spending by the seven categories: inpatient
acute, physician, home health, inpatient non-acute, outpatient, skilled
nursing, and hospice care. By construction, the relative changes in these
seven categories add up to the overall change, barring rounding errors.
Roughly 90 percent of the overall change is due to inpatient acute, physi-
cian, and home health care spending, and so we limit our discussion to
Panels lbid.
Panel lb shows that inpatient acute care spending for women in decile
10 increased 14 percent whereas in decile 1, it increased 33 percent. One
possible explanation for the relative changes in Medicare spending, $255
for women (significant at conventional levels) and $149 for men (not
significant), is the Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) program,
which increases Medicare reimbursement rates (per diagnostic-related
group, or DRGs) to hospitals serving lower income neighborhoods. The
DSH program could influence the relative increase in inpatient health
care by creating incentives to admit more lower income patients (see
Duggan, 1998).
The share of beneficiaries with positive inpatient spending has stayed
roughly constant for the two income groups. How then did the intensity
of care change? To measure intensity, we consider the relative weighting
scale in the DRG used to determine Medicare reimbursement. The advan-
tage of this scale is that it relates solely to utilization and not to reimburse-
ment rates which may vary across areas. For 75 year-old women, the
average index of inpatient utilization increased from 0.35 to 0.45 for the
lowest income group, and from 0.31 to 0.35 for the highest income group.
In other words, real inpatient resource costs increased more than twice as
8Alternatively, we could have assumed that, in the absence of distributional shifts, the
percentage increase in Medicare spending would have been the same in the two income
groups. For Table la, this assumption would have made the implied differential increase
even larger, since the initial level of Medicare spending was lower in decile 1. Also,
assuming that the null hypothesis is a proportional increase in both income groups also
leads to unstable (and somewhat bizarre) implications for the rapid increase in home
health care spending below.98Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
TABLE 1













































































































decile 1990 1995 Change 1990 1995 Change
(a) Normalized to a 75-year-old. t-statistics in parentheses.
1 0 10 10 0 13 13



































1990 1995 Change 1990 1995 Change
1 289 446 157 272 389 117







1990 1995 Change 1990 1995 Change decile
1 33 140 107 34 105 71
10 46 164 118 38 89 51100Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
much for decile 1 as for decile 10. Thus our data suggest that much of the
increase was the consequence of higher levels of actual utilization and not
simply higher payment rates given utilization.
Physician spending appears to explain another small (but significant)
part of the overall difference, as is shown in Panel ic. Overall (inflation-
adjusted) spending for physician care actually falls for dedile 10, al-
though these changes are not economically or statistically important.
Perhaps the most remarkable in the pattern of Medicare spending can
be seen in home health care expenditures. These expenditures grew
dramatically at the national level, from $2.4 billion in 1989 to $12.6 billion
in 1994, accounting for nearly 9 percent of the total Medicare budget by
1994 (Picone and Wilson, 1998). While previous studies have also docu-
mented that lower income elderly people are more likely to be enrolled
in home health care (Picone and Wilson, 1998), it is not generally known
(to our knowledge) how much of the increase in home health care spend-
ing was concentrated in lower-income neighborhoods. For women in
the top income decile, home health care spending increased from $101 in
1990 to $307 in 1995, an increase of $206. For women in the bottom
income decile, however, Medicare spending rose from $217 in 1990 to
$850 in 1995, an increase of $633. The relative increase is therefore $427
per capita, which is significant at conventional levels. Recall that this
number is calculated for every person in the Medicare population (in
that income group), and not just among those who have received home
health care services. Similar results hold for men, although in their case
the differential effect, $252, was smaller in magnitude but still statisti-
cally significant.
The growth in home health care spending has not been uniform across
the country. As documented by Wennberg and Cooper (1997), in some
regions such as Texas and Tennessee, home health care grew dramati-
cally during the 1990s. In other areas, such as Philadelphia, there was
little growth; the level of per capita home health care spending there in
1994-1995 was only $301. By contrast, average per capita price-adjusted
spending in San Antonio, TX was $1,445, while in Chattanooga it was
$1,522 (Wennberg and Cooper, 1997). We therefore considered a similar
dif-in-dif exercise for just these two states, Texas and Tennessee, with
results shown in Table 2.
The overall shifts in patterns of Medicare spending per capita for the
two states, shown in Panel 2a, are larger than the nationwide effects.
The most notable difference is the magnitude of the change in Medicare
spending. For women, among the highest income group Medicare
spending rose by 28 percent (841/2979), while among the lowest income
group it rose by 69 percent; the results were somewhat smaller in magni-The Distributional Effects of Medicare101
TABLE 2
Average Medicare Spending b1j Subcategory and Income Decile for 1990
and 1995 in Texas and Tennessee
Women Men Income
decile 1990 1995 Change 1990 1995 Change
1 2,797 4,722 1,925 3,227 4,575 1,348







decile 1990 1995 Change 1990 1995 Change
1 307 1,324 1,017 250 815 565




(a) Normalized to a 75-year-old. t-statistics in parentheses.
tude for men. The differential shift in Medicare spending was $1084 for
women, and $932 for men (both results significant statistically). Thus in
these states Medicare played a much larger role in shifting resources
towards lower-income households.
As Panel 2b reveals, much of the difference in Medicare spending
across income groups in these two states can be explained by the relative
growth in home health care expenditures. In the bottom income decile
(again for women), home health care spending per capita rose from $307
to $1324, an increase of over $1000 in just 5 years. In the highest income
decile, it rose from $167 to $322, a modest increase of $155. With respect
to home health care alone, lower-income women received a differential
increase in (dollar) Medicare spending of $862; the equivalent amount
was $536 for men.
Why these dramatic increases, and why so concentrated in just a few
states? One explanation is that much of the increase represented "abuse"
in home health care, for example services that were deemed medically
Overall Medicare
Spending(a) (dollars)102Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
unnecessary (Havemann, 1997). But even subtracting out, as an upper
limit, the 40% of visits deemed by one study to be "unjustified" leaves an
enormous growth in spending. Another possibility might be the reduced
length of stay in hospitals, but then why was the growth concentrated in
Texas and Tennessee, and not as much in other states as well that experi-
enced a similar decline in length-of-stay? And why was the growth con-
centrated so heavily among the very lowest-income neighborhoods? Even
accounting for the higher rates of chronic illness in lower-income popula-
tions cannot explain the much higher rates of spending in these neighbor-
hoods. Finally, there may exist a relationship between for-profit hospital
growth in these areas and the expansion of home health care.9 While we
do not pursue these issues here, we believe them to be important topics
for future research.
Ultimately, we care about inequality in health rather than inequality in
Medicare spending. Although we observe that Medicare spending be-
came more equally distributed between 1990 and 1995, our results sug-
gest that health outcomes have not, at least in terms of mortality rates.
Figure 4 shows the negative correlation between mortality and income
for both men and women. Despite the large shift in Medicare resources
towards people in lower income neighborhoods, there has not been any
improvement in survival rates in the first decile; if anything mortality
rates are slightly, although not significantly, higher. By contrast, mortal-
ity rates for higher income deciles have fallen for both men and women
aged 65-74, with significant differences between 1990 and 1995.10 These
results raise the question of whether the extra spending improves health
functioning if the increased benefits are used to fund procedures with
low marginal value.1'
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have documented large differences and large changes
in how Medicare transfers resources to different income groups. During
the period 1990-1995, there was an increase in Medicare spending per
capita for all groups. But for those living in lower-income neighbor-
hoods, the increases were substantially larger, thus leading to a relative
Geographical patterns in Wennberg and Cooper (1997) suggest regions with active for-
profit expansions may be associated with regions having higher-than-average home health
care expenditures.
10A similar but less noticeable pattern holds for ages 75-84.
11Of course, health inequality might have gotten even worse in the absence of these
programs, and differential growth in chronic-care services (including long-term, frequent
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FIGURE 4. Mortality Rates by Income Decile for Ages 65-74: Men
and Women During 1990 and 1995
Notes: Normalized to a person aged 70.
shift in Medicare resources to lower-income households and reducing
some of the inequality we have documented in earlier work. Averaging
across men and women, relative Medicare spending for our representa-
tive 75-year-old increased by $1277 for low-income households, and $534
for high-income households, for a relative per capita increase of $743 in
low-income neighborhoods.
The differential increase of $743 between 1990 and 1995 may not have
improved living standards by a dollar-equivalent increase of $743 in
utility terms, given the possibility that lower income households (for104Lee, McClellan, & Skinner
example) would have preferred cash over nearly daily visits from home
health nurses. Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of this change in the
pattern of Medicare spending was the option of restricting Medicare
spending to rise among all income groups at the rate experienced by
higher income groups, and thereby freeing up more than $700 in addi-
tional government spending for each individual in the bottom income
decile.12
How does this shift of $743 in government spending compare with
other welfare programs for the poor? Average household income among
the elderly in the bottom fifth of the income distribution was $9,238 in
1995 according to the U.S. Census. Since roughly 40 percent of individuals
aged 75 and over live with spouses,13 the differential shift of $770 per
capita translates to $962 per household, or more than a 10-percentage-
point real increase in income for the lower income group, relative to the
higher income group.
Another way to see the importance of these transfers is to consider the
earned-income tax credit (EITC), which is a much-debated transfer pro-
gram designed to subsidize incomes of the working poor. (Obviously,
the overlap between recipients of this program and the Medicare pro-
gram must be slight.) The average transfer payment per household from
the EITC in 1993 was $994 (U.S. Congress, 1994,p. 704). In other words,
the change in income transfers effected by the Medicare program be-
tween 1990 and 1995 is, on a per-household basis, equal to the level of
subsidization under the entire EITC program. Finally, we consider the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which is designed to as-
sist low-income elderly people. It seems reasonable to expect a strong
overlap between poor neighborhoods in our lowest income decile and
those eligible for SSI. Financial assistance for single recipients was $204
per month, or $2448 annually. Since only about 55 percent of the poor
elderly are in fact eligible, the level of assistance is $1346, on a per capita
basis among low-income elderly. In other words, the change in Medi-
care transfers to lower income neighborhoods is more than half of the
per capita level of SSI support.
During the past decade, there has been considerable expansion in
policies designed to improve health care access for lower-income people.
One is the DSH program, which provided additional funding to hospi-
12We ignore the moral hazard problems inherent in instituting a cash-based income trans-
fer program.
In other words, we assume 60 percent of individuals are heads of their household, and
pairs of the remaining 40 percent constitute a household, meaning the ratio of households
to individuals is 0.8.The Distributional Effects of Medicare105
tals serving a large fraction of low-income patients (Coughlin and Liska,
1998). The major focus of the program has been to offset low levels of
Medicaid hospital reimbursements. Another program is the Qualified
Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) Program, which requires Medicaid to pick
up Medicare premiums, copayments, and deductibles forpeople under
the poverty line; an associated program called Specified Low-Income
Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMB) provides benefits for Part B premiums
only for beneficiaries with slightly higher incomes. We have not studied
extensively how these programs might have affected the redistributional
realigiiment in the Medicare program. However, Parente and Evans
(1998) did not find strong evidence to suggest that QMB might have
caused a large increase in utilization among the lower-income elderly
population.
Another important issue that warrants further investigation is how all
of the additional spending on lower income groups translates into better
health outcomes or quality of life more generally. While mortality rates
among lower income groups do not show much improvement, perhaps
other benefits of having home health care visits (or more inpatient ser-
vices) are commensurate with the additional spending. If not, one might
question whether the money is of maximal effectiveness in reducing
income inequality.
Recent restrictions on utilization of home health care spending are
likely to have significant effects on the redistributive effect of Medicare.
In particular, one-thousand home health care agencies have already
closed in 1998, with half of those in Texas (Dodge, 1998). Despite some
last-minute funding for home health care, it may be the case that a
consequence of the reforms contained in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 will be to swing the redistributional effects of Medicare back in the
other direction towards the status quo of 1990. Nevertheless, our results
indicate that changes in Medicare policies have major redistributive con-
sequences, which are as yet largely unreported and unexplored.
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